In the paper, we analyze the security vulnerability of the key agreement protocol proposed by Lee et al.' 
Introduction
Mobile communication greatly facilitates communication between mobile users. With the help of portable devices, such as cellular phones and personal digital assistants, the users can freely roam and enjoy mobile services. Now, group communication is an important research issue for mobile communication. Secure mobile communication should guarantee the confidentiality and authentication for the mobile users and the communication messages. A group key agreement protocol can be used to realize the secure group communication in a mobile environment. In a group key agreement protocol, all participants cooperatively establish the group key. The communicating parties can use the group key together with standard cryptographic algorithms for message encryption and authentication in order to preserve privacy and authentication. A secure authenticated group key agreement in a mobile environment can guarantee the authentication for legitimate group members, and it also can guarantee the secure intergroup communication from nonmembers. On the other hand, one advantage of the contributory group key agreement protocol is that no participant can control the final value of the group key. Therefore, a contributory group key agreement is often used to prevent some parties from having any kind of advantage over the others. In this paper, we focus on the secure contributory group key agreement protocols.
Recently, many group key agreement protocols have been proposed [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] , which can also be classified into two kinds: the static [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] and the dynamic [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] . The difference between the former and the later is whether the users can join or leave the group at any time. In 1996, the method of natural extensions of Diffie-Hellman key exchange to nparty case was proposed [6] . It was useful to construct the key agreement protocols for the dynamic group. Based on Diffie-Hellman key agreement, a key agreement for highly dynamic group was developed by Steiner, et al., [7] . However, in [7] , the security services c i , which is generated by using keyed cryptographic hash function H 1 , can be seemed as the message authentication code for U i and A i . More security and performance analysis will be discussed in Section 4.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, some basic knowledge and Lee's group key agreement protocol are briefly reviewed, and the security weakness of Lee's protocol is proved, too. In Section 3, we present a new contributory group key agreement protocol, whose correctness, security, and performances are analyzed in Section 4. In Section 5, we conclude.
Preliminary

Bilinear Pairings
Let λ be a security parameter. The pairing is defined as e: G 1 ×G 1 →G 2 , where G 1 is an additive cyclic group of prime order q, and G 2 is a multiplicative cyclic group of the same order and P is an arbitrary generator of G 1 . A cryptographic bilinear pairing has the following properties:
Bilinear: For any R, S∈G 1 and a, b∈Z q * , e(aR, bS) = e(R, S) ab . This can be restated as, for any R, S, TG 1 
, e(R+S, T) = e(R, T )e(S, T) and e(R, S+T) =e(R, S)e(R, T ).
Non-degenerate: There exists R, S∈G 1 such that e(R, S)≠I, where I denotes the identity element of the group G 2 .
Computable: Given R, S∈G 1 , there exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(R, S).
The bilinear parings can be derived from the Weil or Tate pairing [20, 21] .
Definition 1
The Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) in G 1 is defined as: Given the generator P of G 1 and Q∈G 1 , compute a∈Z q * such that Q = aP. The ECDLP in G 1 is assumed to be computationally hard and can be efficiently reduced to DLP in G 2 [22] .
Definition 2 Given a generator P of a group G 1 and a random triple (P, aP, bP), the Bilinear Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (BCDHP) is to compute abP.
Assumption: In our paper, we always assume that ECDLP and BCDHP are hard computational problems such that there is no polynomial time algorithm to solve either of them.
Review of Lee's Group Key Agreement Protocol
In this section, Lee's group key agreement protocol [5] is briefly reviewed. Without loss of generality, let U={U 1 ,U 2 , ...,U n } be the initial set of participants that want to generate a common group key. Let X i ∈ Z q * and Y i (=X i P) be U i 's long-term private key and long-term public key, respectively. Here, some notations used in Lee's protocol are shown in Table 1 . The steps of Lee's group key agreement protocol are as follows:
Step 1 (Round 1) First, each U i (1≤i≤n−1) selects a random number a i ∈ Z q * and then computes a i −1 and A i =a i P. Then, each U i can generate the signature S i =X i A i and send the triple (U i , A i , S i ) to the powerful node U n .
Step 2 (Round 2) After receiving each (U i , A i , S i ) (1≤i≤n−1), U n verifies e(S i , P)=e(A i ,Y i ). If it holds, U n can ensure that (U i , A i , S i ) is sent by U i . Then U n selects a random number a n ∈ Z q * and computes x i =a n A i . Then, U n computes B=H(U n , x 1 , x 2 , ...,
x n−1 ) and S n =X n B. Next, U n can compute the common group key K=e(a n P,
Finally, U n broadcasts (U n , x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n−1 , S n ) to other nodes.
Step 3 (Common group key) After receiving the broadcast, each U j (1≤j≤n−1) computes B=H(U n , x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n−1 ) and verifies whether e(S n , P)=e(B, Y n ). If it is correct, 
Security Weakness of Lee's Protocol
We prove that Lee's protocol is still not an authenticated protocol due to the forgery of the messages in round 1. In fact, in round 1, the transmitted and signed messages (U i , A i , S i ) (1≤i≤n−1) can be modified and forged, where S i =X i A i , and X i is long-term private key of U i with the corresponding public key Y i . Given a triple (U i , A i , S i ), an adversary can modify it and forge a valid signed message by using the steps as follows:
Step 1 First, the adversary selects a random number b i ∈ Z q * and computes A i * =b i A i , and then forges the signature S i
Step 2 Then, the adversary sends the triple ( According to Theorem 2.1, it is known that the signature (U i , A i , S i ) can be modified and forged. So, in round 2, once the powerful node receives a signature, it cannot ensure whether the signature is generated by U i or forged by the adversary. It makes that the transmitted and signed messages cannot be authenticated by U n . What is more, once U n receives the triples (
is a modified and forged signature, which can pass the verification, U n will compute and broadcast (U n , x 1 , x 2 , ...,
.., x n−1 ) and S n =X n B. Then, for the user U i , the common group key should be
). According to the analysis above, it is found that Lee's protocol cannot authenticate the validity of transmitted data, and the victim U i can neither compute the common group key nor communicate with the other nodes securely.
Efficiency Analysis of Lee's Protocol
To analyze the efficiency of Lee's protocol from pairings, we mainly analyze the pairing operations. In a pairing-based scheme, compared with the other operations, the pairing operation is the most time-consuming [21] . According to the best result [23] , one pairing operation is about 11110 multiplications in 163 3 F , while a point scalar multiplication of E/ 163 3 F is a few hundred multiplications in 163 
3
F . Then, in a pairingbased scheme, the pairing operations should be less used. However, in Lee's authenticated protocol, to authenticate the signatures sent from the mobile users, U n has to finish computing 2n-1 bilinear pairings. That is, in Lee's protocol, for the node U n , the computing burden of the bilinear pairing has a linear relation with the numbers of mobile users. Therefore, to make the key agreement more efficient, in the next section, we improve the protocol such that the pairing operations of U n are independent of the number of the mobile users. In fact, in our protocol, U n only needs to compute two pairing operations.
New Construction of Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol in Imbalanced Mobile Environment
To overcome the security weakness and improve the efficiency of Lee's protocol, we present a new key agreement protocol in an imbalanced mobile environment. Here, for ease of making a performance comparison in Section 4.3, we extend Lee's notations in Table 2 . The detailed steps of our protocol are described as follows.
Step 1 (Round 1) First, each U i (1≤i≤n−1) selects a random number a i ∈ Z q * and then 
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Our authenticated protocol can be proved to be a contributory group key agreement protocol. We show the proof as follows.
Theorem 3.1 By running the proposed protocol, an identical group key can be established by all mobile clients. Each client can confirm that its contribution was included in the group key.
Proof. In our protocol, U n broadcasts (U n , D 1 , D 2 , ..., D n−1 ) to all mobile clients, and each client U i (1≤i≤n−1) can use its long-term private key X i and the secret number a i to compute an identical group key K. That is, the following equations hold: ) , ) (( . Therefore, we have:
Observing the above equations, each D i includes the long-term private key X i and secret number a i of U i . Therefore, the group key K contains all clients' long-term private key X i and secret number a i . That is, each client can confirm that its contribution was included in the group key.
Correctness
The correctness of our protocol is proved in the following theorems. Theorem 4.1 In our protocol, all participants can establish and share an identical common group key K. That is, they can compute the common group key K by using the equations as follows:
where 1≤j≤n−1.
Proof. According to our protocol, it is known that Y n =X n P, A j =a j X j Y n , B j =A j X n -1 and D j =a n B j . Using the properties of the bilinear pairing, we have
This implies that the powerful node U n and other mobile clients U j (1≤j≤n−1) can share the common group key K. Proof. Note that the long-term private key X n is only mastered by the powerful node U n . Therefore, in round 2, only the powerful node U n can compute B i =A i X n -1 , +hP)= e(P/(X n +h), (X n +h)P) =e(P, P) =g. In fact, S can be seemed as the signature proposed by Zhang et al [21] . In [21] , this signature S had been proved to be secure against forgery. Then, each U j (1≤j≤n−1) can verify the message (U n , D 1 , D 2 , . .., D n−1 ) sent from the powerful node U n .
Security Analysis
In this section, we prove that our protocol is secure. An attacker cannot obtain the established group key by eavesdropping on the messages transmitted over the public channel. To prove the security of our protocol, we adopt the Square-Exponent Problem (SEP) [21, 24, 25] .
Let θ be a generator which generates the group G, i.e., for any y∈ G, there exists x∈ Z |G| such that y=θ x . The Square-Exponent Problem (SEP) is defined as follow. 
Assumption:
We always assume that SEP is hard computational problem such that there is no polynomial time algorithm to solve it with non-negligible probability.
Theorem 4.4 Under the hardness assumption of SEP, the proposed group key agreement protocol is secure. An attacker cannot obtain the established group key by eavesdropping on messages transmitted over the public channel.
Proof. To prove the security of our protocol, we use the contradiction proof technique under the hardness assumption of SEP. That is, we prove that if there exists an efficient probabilistic polynomial algorithm F which can obtain the established group key, we can construct another efficient algorithm F' to compute 2 b  from θ and θ b , which is conflict to the hardness assumption of SEP.
Assume that there exists an efficient probabilistic polynomial algorithm F that can compute the common group key K with a probability ε from the messages transmitted over the public channel. Based on the algorithm F, we show that another polynomial algorithm F' can be constructed to solve an instance of SEP with a probability ε. Assume that F' knows the long-term private key X n . That is, F' can be run by the powerful node U n . Now, F' setups the algorithm as follows. To do so, algorithm F' randomly selects w 1 , w 2 , ..., w n−2 ∈Z q * and computes
Then, the algorithm F' has constructed all (A i , D i ), for 1≤ i≤ n−1. It should be noted that in step 2 of our protocol in Section 3, D i =a n B i . Here, according to the construction of algorithm F', there exists the relation D i =bB i . Then, in algorithm F', the number b can be seemed as the number a n in Section 3. Then, F' calls F with all (A i , D i ) for 1≤ i≤ n−1 so as to the attacker F computes the common group key K. If the algorithm F can compute the common group key
F' can compute e D P  proved to be secure against forgery in [21] . Therefore, an attacker cannot forge the valid authenticator (U i , A i , c i ) or the signature S. Theorem 4.6 A disclosed session common group key does not affect the security of the proposed protocol.
Proof. In general, in a group key agreement protocol, a compromised session common group key must not affect the security of other session common group key. That is, the requirement of forward or backward secrecy should be satisfied. In our protocol, the session common group key can be derived from
where the random numbers a i (1≤ i≤ n) are chosen independently by the participants U i (1≤ i≤ n) respectively from each session. Then, all the session common group keys are independent each other from different sessions. Thereby, an adversary cannot derive another session common group key K' from a disclosed session common group key K.
Performance Comparison
In this Section, we show the performance comparison of Nam's protocol [3] , Tseng's protocol [4] , Lee's protocol [5] and our authenticated protocol. For ease of comparison, we use the notations defined as follows:
|m|: the bit length of a message m T exp : the time for modular exponentiation T inv : the time for modular inverse T mul : the time for modular multiplication T bp : the time for bilinear pairing T smul : the time for scalar multiplication T sadd : the time for scalar addition T H : the time for hashing operation T dec : the time for decrypting operation using the standard symmetric algorithm In the Table 3 as follow, the contributory property, the nonauthenticated or the authenticated property, the number of rounds, the size of the transmitted messages, the computational complexity required for each client and the powerful node, and the underlying problems of different protocols are compared. Table 3 , it is found the protocols of Nam, Tseng and Lee have the same security weakness. That is, they are all noauthenticated protocols. In Theorem 4.5, the unforgery of the transmitted authenticator (U i , A i , c i ) and the signature S are proved. So, our protocol is an authenticated one. At the same time, our protocol has the forward and backward security property, which has been proved in Theorem 4.6.
On the other hand, it is found both Lee and our protocols are pairing-based protocol. However, in Lee's protocol, to authenticate the transmitted messages and construct the group key, U n has to compute at least 2n-1 pairing operations. That is, the more clients, the more pairing operations. In our protocol, U n only needs to compute one pairing operations. It is found that the message size of every protocol listed in Table 3 grows linearly with the number of participants. This is because the resulting common group key should be composed of contributions by all participants in a contributory group key agreement protocol. So, it is necessary for the powerful node U n to broadcast the contributions of all the participants to generate the common group key. This will cause that the message size broadcasted by the powerful node U n grows linearly with the number of participants.
Let us consider the computational cost for each client. In our protocol, each client can precompute (X i -1 , a i -1 , (a i X i ) -1 , a i , A i , c i ) off-line and store them on its memory card. Then, in our protocol, for each client, only two pairing operations online are required. But, in Lee's protocol, three pairing operations have to be computed online by each client. Table 3 shows that our protocol is an authenticated protocol, while the others not. On the other hand, the security of our authenticated key agreement protocol is based on ECDLP, BCDHP and SEP.
Conclusions
The design of a secure group key agreement protocol for mobile wireless networks is an important issue to provide secure services among mobile devices. Although many group key agreement protocols have been proposed, most of them have one shortcoming or another. In this paper, we demonstrate that Lee et al.'s key agreement protocol in the mobile environment is a nonauthenticated protocol. Then, we propose a new one based on bilinear pairings. Our protocol overcomes the security drawback of Lee et al., and it is more efficient than the ones of the same kinds. The new protocol can be proved to be secure under the hardness assumptions of ECDLP, BCDHP and SEP. What is more, our protocol is a contributory group key agreement protocol. Our protocol can be used to guarantee the secure group communication for legitimate group members in an imbalanced mobile environment.
